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Abstract
The European Commission requested EFSA to estimate the risk of spread of African swine fever (ASF)
and to identify potential risk factors (indicators) for the spread of ASF, given introduction in the south-
eastern countries of Europe (region of concern, ROC), namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Three EU Member States
(MS) – Croatia, Greece and Slovenia – were included in the ROC due to their geographical location and
ASF-free status. Based on collected information on potential risk factors (indicators) for each country
and the relevant EU regulations in force, the estimated probability of spread of ASF within the ROC
within one year after introduction into the ROC was assessed to be very high (from 66% to 100%).
This estimate was determined after considering the high number of indicators present in most of the
countries in the ROC and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread, especially
those related to the structure of the domestic pig sector, the presence of wild boar and social factors.
The presence of indicators varies between countries in the ROC. Each country is at risk of ASF spread
following introduction; however, some countries may have a higher probability of ASF spread following
introduction. In addition, the probability of ASF spread from the ROC to EU MSs outside the ROC
within one year after introduction of ASF in the ROC was estimated to be very low to low (from 0% to
15%). This estimate was based on the comparison of the indicators present in the ROC and the
already affected countries in south-eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where there was
no evidence of ASF spread to other EU MS within one year.
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Summary
TOR 1 requested EFSA to estimate the risk of spread of African swine fever (ASF) in the south-
eastern countries of Europe and to identify the main risk factors of spread. For the purpose of this risk
assessment, the south-eastern countries of Europe included all ASF-free countries in south-eastern
Europe in December 2018 (the moment of receiving the mandate), namely Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia1 and Slovenia.
Collectively, these countries are subsequently referred to as the ‘region of concern’ (ROC). Three of the
above-mentioned countries (Croatia, Greece and Slovenia) are EU Member States (MSs) that were
included in the ROC due to their geographical location and ASF-free disease status.
The risk assessment focused on the assessment of the probability of ASF spread within the ROC, as
well as the probability of spread from the ROC to as-yet-unaffected EU MSs outside the ROC following
introduction of ASF into the ROC. Considering the short time frame of the mandate, EFSA was not
asked to assess the likely direction of ASF spread, but rather to perform a qualitative assessment and
to highlight the factors that may impact the spread of the disease from the ROC, once introduced, and
to evaluate if some countries in the ROC are at higher risk of spread than others.
To assess the probability of spread of ASF within the ROC after introduction, five groups of
potential risk factors (indicators) were identified that could potentially affect the spread of ASF in the
ROC, once introduced, including: (1) indicators related to ASF spread in domestic pig populations (i.e.
if swill feeding is allowed in the country, the presence of free-ranging pigs and home slaughtering as
well as a substantial number of smallholders in the country); (2) indicators related to spread of ASF in
wild boar populations (i.e. the average wild boar density and suitable wild boar habitat in the country);
(3) indicators related to connectedness within the area (i.e. trade of pigs and pork/products); (4)
indicators related to the societal context (i.e. consumption of pork or pork products and the ‘at risk of
poverty’ rate) and (5) indicators related to preparedness and response activities (i.e. whether there
was an operating pig identification and movement registration system, a passive surveillance system,
contingency planning and laboratory capacity). These groups of indicators were selected based on the
experience gained during the ASF epidemic in Europe over the last decade. Information on each of
these indicators for the countries of the ROC was collected and evaluated.
Based on a collective evaluation of all indicators, experts of the standing working group on ASF
estimated by consensus the likelihood of spread of ASF in the ROC as a whole and evaluated the
uncertainty of their assessment. The existence of a legal framework for the three EU MSs of the ROC
was taken into account. It was concluded that due to the high number of indicators present in most of
the countries in the ROC and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread
(especially those related to the structure of the domestic pig sector, the presence of wild boar and
social factors), the probability that ASF will spread within the ROC if the disease within one year
following introduction is between 66% and 100% (i.e. very high).
The data collected for the identified indicators were either qualitative or quantitative. To determine
whether the probability of ASF spread given an introduction of ASF was higher within any particular
country within the ROC, the value of the quantitative indicators for that country (e.g. percentages of
smallholders) was compared to the median value of the indicators of the whole ROC. For the
qualitative indicators, it was indicated whether these were present or absent. A country was
considered at risk of ASF spread if at least one qualitative indicator was present, or at least one
quantitative indicator lay above the median. In addition, variation in risk between countries was
assessed based on the number of indicators present for each country. It was concluded that the
presence of indicators varies between countries in the ROC. Each country is at risk of ASF spread
following introduction, as each country had several indicators present. However, there are several
countries with higher numbers of pigs and a high number of indicators present, which would likely
represent a higher probability of spread following introduction.
Finally, to assess the potential spread of ASF from the ROC to non-affected EU countries
outside the ROC, given introduction into the ROC, the working group experts selected, as before,
several groups of indicators that could favour spread of ASF from the ROC into non-affected areas of
the EU. These indicators were mainly related to connectedness of the ROC to the non-affected area of
the EU (e.g. people movements, the presence of shared borders and hunting tourism). It was
hypothesised that indicators related to the societal context, such as the risk of poverty rate, may also
contribute to ASF spread. Legal trade of live pigs and pig meat or products of pig origin from third
1 ASF was detected in Serbia after the risk assessment was finalised, and before publication of this Scientific Opinion.
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countries of the ROC to non-affected MS is very limited as EU rules provide strict risk-mitigating
measures, and the rules in place include personal consignments. Additionally, free trade from the three
EU MSs of the ROC to other EU MSs outside the ROC takes place owing to the existence of a EU legal
framework. Further, the majority of pig farms in the ROC are smallholders, with pig and pork
production mainly for personal consumption. The local movement of wild boar populations across
borders was assessed to have a limited impact on the probability of ASF spread from the ROC to MS
outside the ROC, as there is only one country (Slovenia, currently not affected) in the ROC with a land
border to a non-affected MSs. However, there is a high level of movement of people through tourism
or migration.
A comparison was made between indicators in ROC countries and in countries of south-eastern
Europe that are already affected, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where there was no evidence of ASF
spread to other EU MS within one year after initial ASF introduction. The probability of ASF spread
from the ROC to non-affected MSs outside the ROC within one year after introduction of ASF into the
ROC was estimated to be very low to low (from 0% to 15%).
Risk of ASF in south-eastern Europe
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
1.1.1. Background
African Swine Fever (ASF) Genotype II was present in nine European Union (EU) Member States
(MSs) at the time of the assessment: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia,2 Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania. As in 2014 the disease is mainly limited geographically to the Eastern part of the
EU, with the disease being maintained in the wild boar population along the EU Eastern borders
followed by an occasional spill-over in domestic pig holdings.
The developments in Romania during the summer of 2018 have highlighted a new pattern mainly
focused on domestic pig holdings of any size, with few occurrences reported in wild boar. It is likely
that this latter situation heavily relies on the spread through the human factor.
For the near future, the two main risks for the EU are represented by: (i) the specific situation in
Romania; and (ii) a more generalised risk of witnessing the so-called jumps of the disease, due to the
long distance spread by human factor.
Member States and the Commission are continuously updating the EU strategic approach to ASF
and the related legislation. There is knowledge, legislation, scientific, technical and financial tools in
the EU to properly face ASF.
The current situation in EU calls for the development of an EU strategy for the South Eastern Part of
Europe based on scientific recommendations by EFSA. This strategy should be built and evolved on the
basis of new science available and on new experiences gained. It is therefore necessary to better
determine the extent of the problem to better target preventive and control measures in the light of the
current development of the ASF epidemic updating and completing previous EFSA scientific opinions.
1.1.2. Terms of Reference
In accordance with Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002, EFSA is requested to provide a
Scientific Opinion on the:
• Estimation of the risk of spread of ASF in the South Eastern Countries of Europe; identification
and description of the main risk factors including the fact that some among of these are EU
MSs.
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
TOR 1 asks to estimate the risk of spread of ASF in the south-eastern countries of Europe, once
ASF would be introduced in the area, including the fact that some among of these are EU MSs; and to
identify the main risk factors (indicators) for the spread of the disease.
For the purposes of this risk assessment, the south-eastern countries of Europe included all ASF-
free countries in south-eastern Europe in December 2018 (this being the moment when the mandate
was first received), including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro,
the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia3 and Slovenia. Collectively, these countries were subsequently
referred to as the ‘region of concern’ (ROC). Three of the above-mentioned countries (Croatia,
Greece and Slovenia) are EU MSs that were included in the ROC due to their geographical localisation
and the ASF-free disease status.
This request did not include an assessment of the risk of introduction into the south-eastern
countries in Europe as such. Rather, the probability of spread of ASF within one year after
introduction in the ROC was assessed provided that ASF would be introduced in the ROC.
Considering the short time frame of the mandate, EFSA was not asked to assess the likely direction of
the spread of ASF, neither the extend of spread, but rather to highlight the factors that may impact
the further spread of ASF within and from the ROC, once introduced. In addition, considering the lack
of data, and the short time available a qualitative risk assessment was carried out.
With other words, in this document ‘spread’ is defined as a synonym for propagation of ASF within
a year, implying transfer of the infection to other animals, farms or subregions.
2 At the time of the mandate (December 2018), Czechia was not yet officially free of ASF, but in March 2019, Czechia was
officially recognised to be free of ASF. In July 2019, also Slovakia was affected by ASF. This introduction took place after the
risk assessment.
3 The first outbreak of ASF in Serbia was reported only in July 2019, i.e. after the time when this mandate was received.
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As a starting point, information about potential risk factors, or indicators that may lead to possible
spread of ASF in the individual countries was collected. The overall probability of spread, however, was
addressed by considering the ROC as a whole region, highlighting only those aspects that were of
particular concern in individual countries. Hereby, the relevant EU regulations that are in force in the
three EU MS in the ROC were considered. In addition, data on indicators from Romania and Bulgaria –
two EU MS and affected countries in south-eastern Europe – were also provided as a comparison with
the ROC. The collected data related to the following areas: (1) domestic pig (DP) and wild boar (WB)
population and its interface; (2) connectivity between the countries in the ROC and EU MS, e.g. trade
of pigs, pork and products and movement of people; (3) the social context in the countries; and (4)
preparedness and responsive activities for epidemic diseases.
The same qualitative risk assessment approach was used to assess the probability of introduction
of ASF into the free EU MS outside the ROC. Again, the relevant regulations and risk mitigation
measures concerning movement of pigs and pork/products and personal consignments to the EU from
the non-EU countries, as well as the regulations concerning the internal movements within the EU
(considering that there are the three EU MS in the ROC) were taken into account. The collected data
concerned (1) connectedness to the non-affected area of the EU and (2) the social context.
2. Methodology
2.1. Risk of spread of African swine fever in the south-eastern countries
of Europe
2.1.1. Potential spread of ASF in the region of concern after possible
introduction
Based on the experience gained during the ASF epidemic in Europe over the last decade, the
working group experts selected a range of risk factors (indicators) that could potentially favour the
spread of ASF following introduction into the ROC. The working group globally assessed the value of
each of the indicators in the ROC countries and compared this with the situation in already affected
countries in the EU. Hereby, the relevant EU regulations that are in force in the three EU MS in the ROC
were considered. Subsequently, the experts of the working group estimated, by consensus, the
likelihood of spread of ASF in the ROC within one year after possible introduction in the ROC, by
evaluating all the indicators for all the countries of the ROC together. They also assessed the uncertainty
of their assessment collectively according to EFSA’s guidance on uncertainty in scientific assessments
(EFSA, 2019). The following scale was used for the likelihood assessment: (Table 1).
The indicators that were taken into consideration are listed below:
• Indicators related to spread of ASF in domestic pig populations
 Swill-feeding is allowed in the country. Swill-feeding is well recognised as a risk factor
for ASF (Mannelli et al., 1997; Bellini et al., 2016), facilitating spread particularly to
unaffected farms. In the EU, it is important to note that swill feeding is prohibited
(Commission Decision 2003/328/EC).
 Presence of free-ranging pigs in some areas in the country. Free-ranging pig production
is a recognised risk factor for ASF maintenance (Mannelli et al., 1997; Mur et al., 2016) as
these animals at greater risk of contact with potentially infected wild boar. In the EU, it is
important to note that all pigs, also free-ranging pigs, are considered to be domestic pigs
and should be identified (Council Directive 2008/71/EC).
Table 1: Probability scale used for the assessment
Probability term
Approximate probability
range (%)
Very high probability 66–100
High probability 33–66
Moderate probability 15–33
Low probability 1–15
Very low probability 0–1
Risk of ASF in south-eastern Europe
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 Substantial number of smallholders. There is no common definition of non-commercial pig
holdings in the ROC. In this opinion, the percentage of farms with up to, and including 10
pigs per holding, and the percentage of all domestic pigs that were kept in these farms,
have been used as proxies of the size of the non-commercial pig sector. These farms are
referred to as ‘smallholders’ throughout the rest of this document (Table 2 and Figure 1).
Smallholders generally have lower levels of farm biosecurity than commercial farms, and
biosecurity is known to be a key constraint to ASF eradication (Mur et al., 2016). Low levels
of biosecurity are a recognised risk factor for many infectious diseases of livestock, including
ASF (Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2013). The risk of ASF endemicity and spread will be
influenced by the number, density and characteristics of pig farms with low biosecurity.
 Home-slaughtering of pigs is common in the country. Home-slaughtering is a feature
of non-professional pig production, which is a known constraint to ASF control (Mur et al.,
2016).
• Indicators related to spread of ASF in wild boar populations
 Average wild boar density (number of wild boar hunted per km2) at country level: wild
boar are an important contributor to ASF maintenance and spread in the current European
epidemic (Costard et al., 2013b; Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2013; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018).
 Suitable wild boar habitat (% of area in the country with suitable wild boar habitat):
wild boar are an important contributor to ASF maintenance and spread in the current
European epidemic (Costard et al., 2013b; Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2013; EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2018; Sanchez-Cordon et al., 2018).
• Indicators related to connectedness within the ROC
 Movement of pigs and pork/products (numbers of pigs and kg of pork and pork
products moved between the countries of the ROC): The ASF virus can survive for long
periods of time in pork and pork products, which increases the risk of ASF spread to ASF-
free areas (Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2013). Movement of pigs and pork and wild boar
products to the three EU MSs in the ROC is additionally regulated by Commission
Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU which sets a series of animal health movement
restrictions and control measures applicable to the dispatch of live pigs, pigs and wild
boar meat. Some movements are allowed through derogations. The way the restrictions
and the derogations are applied is linked with the areas listed in the implementing
Decision. Free movement of live pigs and pig products from the three EU MSs of the ROC
is regulated. On the other hand, no export from the non-EU MSs of the ROC to any EU
MSs (including the three MSs of the ROC) is permitted, unless specific provisions apply
and a specific authorisation exist (Commission Regulation (EU) 206/2010).
• Indicators related to the societal context
The importance of social factors (human factors) in the context of animal disease control is
well recognised:
In broad terms, Moore et al. (2016) highlight the relationship between societal factors, such as
poverty and corruption, and vulnerability to infectious disease. Further, compliance with the
legal requirements laid down by veterinary authorities (VAs) is central to the success of control
and eradication efforts, including ASF (Costard et al., 2013b; Gogin et al., 2013; Sanchez-
Vizcaıno et al., 2013; Martınez-Lopez et al., 2015; Mur et al., 2016).
With respect to ASF, a series of studies have highlighted the contribution of socioeconomic
factors to the maintenance of ASF in Sardinia (Mur et al., 2016; Cappai et al., 2019; Loi et al.,
2019). The risk of ASF maintenance was increased in municipalities with higher levels of human
deprivation (defined as a lack of goods, services, amenities and physical environment), reduced
educational levels and low employment (Cappai et al., 2019; Loi et al., 2019). These were
generally depopulated areas, noting that illegal breeding in free-range territories (which is
recognised as one of the primary reasons for endemic persistence of ASF in this area (Mur et al.,
2016) is mainly practiced in mountainous areas that are economically deprived with limited
outside access (Cappai et al., 2019). In these areas, biosecurity is often absent (Mur et al.,
2016). Illegal trade of products and pigs has been an important feature of pig production on
Sardinia and is likely a factor in the maintenance of ASF on the island (Mur et al., 2016).
Risk of ASF in south-eastern Europe
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For instance, several FVO audits from Romania (European Commission, 2017; 2018) have noted
high levels of non-compliance among smallholders with key EU regulations relating to disease
control, including pig identification, registration and movement, constraining efforts to control
the disease. Similar findings were also reported by the National Sanitary Veterinary and Food
Safety Authority of Romania in the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed
(National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority Romania, 2019) in July 2019, e.g. non-
compliance with identification and registration rules by smallholders (unidentified pigs over 60
days, the national database not updated, undeclared home-slaughter, keeping ear tags after
home slaughter, etc.) and national biosecurity requirements (feeding with household waste, lack
of disinfecting footwear, lack of work equipment, etc.)
 Consumption of pork or pork products. Societal norms with respect to pork
consumption are likely to influence societal interest in pig production, particularly among
smallholders. (Sanchez-Vizcaıno et al., 2013).
 ‘At risk of poverty’ rate, this being the proportion of the total population at risk of
poverty or social exclusion (Eurostat, 2019). Two potential links between poverty and ASF
are hypothesised:
○ Firstly, non-commercial livestock production is generally of increased importance in
poorer societies, reflected in the number and density of smallholder farmers. As reflected
above, smallholders generally have lower levels of awareness about husbandry, disease
and biosecurity. Several recent studies have highlighted the association between human
deprivation and ASF maintenance in Sardinia (Mur et al., 2016; Cappai et al., 2019;
Loi et al., 2019).
○ Secondly, it is recognised that national resource constraints will impact resources
available to VAs for animal disease preparedness and response (Perry et al., 2001;
Amanfu, 2006; Jurado et al., 2018), despite the co-funding provided by the European
Commission to MSs to support their fight against ASF.
Collectively, these factors will have an impact on efforts to limit ASF spread following introduction.
• Indicators related to preparedness and response activities
ASF control and eradication rely on classical disease control methods, including surveillance,
epidemiological investigation, tracing of pigs and stamping out in infected holdings (Sanchez-
Vizcaıno et al., 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015; Council Directive 2002/60/EC). Preparedness and
response activities, including movement registration, passive surveillance and contingency
planning, are central to this. Further, animal identification and farm records were identified as
important preventive measures for ASF by a recent panel of experts (Jurado et al., 2018).
Experiences from the ongoing epidemic in Europe and elsewhere suggest that any delay in
detection of an incursion of ASF into a free area, and so a delay in implementation of control
measures, will increase the probability for further spread of the disease. A functional passive
surveillance system is crucial for early detection, and up-to-date contingency plans (CPs) in
place, appropriate laboratory capacity and functional pig identification and movement
registration systems form the basis for an efficient outbreak response. Here, a range of options
were considered, including
○ No, or inadequate operating pig identification and movement registration system in the
country.
○ No, or weak, implementation of passive surveillance.
○ No updated contingency plan or simulation exercises for ASF.
○ No or poor laboratory capacity.
2.1.2. Comparison of potential spread of ASF between countries in the region of
concern, given introduction
To determine if a particular country within the ROC could be at higher probability of ASF spread
given introduction, each of the potential indicators for that country was compared with the median of
the whole ROC. For quantitative factors, those indicators that were above the regional median were
considered ‘+’, and those below the median were ‘’. For qualitative factors, binary indicators were
given a ‘+’ if they were fulfilled, and a ‘’ if they were not (Table 21). A country was considered at
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relative risk if at least one qualitative indicator was present, or at least one quantitative indicator lay
above the median of the ROC. When no information was available, this was indicated with a question
mark. After the assessment was conducted for all the countries of the ROC, the different countries
were compared by the numbers of indicators present that could potentially lead to spread, i.e. by
assessing if a given country was standing out by having possibly all, or almost all, or none of the
indicators present. The existence of an EU legal framework was also considered.
2.1.3. Potential spread of ASF, given introduction, from the region of concern to
non-affected EU countries
As before, the working group experts selected a group of indicators that could potentially
favour spread of ASF from south-eastern countries of Europe into the non-affected area of the EU:
• Indicators related to connectedness to the non-affected area of the EU:
 trade of pigs and pork/products people movement shared borders commercial hunting, hunting tourism
Each of these factors will contribute to the potential for connectedness between regions, either via
people (people movement, shared borders, commercial hunting, hunting tourism) or pigs and pork
products (trade of pigs and pork/products, shared borders). These connections are recognised as risk
factors for ASF spread from ASF-infected regions (Bellini et al., 2016; Jurado et al., 2018).
• Indicators related to the societal context
 Risk of poverty: share of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion by country.
As indicated in Section 2.1.1, it is hypothesised that these indicators may contribute to ASF spread.
A similar methodology as described in Section 2.1.1 to assess the likelihood of ASF spread within
the ROC was applied to estimate the probability that ASF would spread to a non-affected MSs outside
the ROC in the year following introduction, along with the uncertainty present in the assessment.
3. Data
3.1. TOR 1. Risk of spread of African swine fever in the south-eastern
countries of Europe
3.1.1. Domestic pigs
Populations of domestic pigs and husbandry systems in south-eastern Europe
Data on the structure of the pig industry and domestic pig distribution were retrieved from the
Eurostat database and obtained from national veterinary administrations from the Balkan countries.
Table 2: Domestic pig population in south-eastern Europe
Country
Number of pigs
in country
(heads)a
Pig density,
(heads/km2 of
agricultural
land)b
% of small
holdings***
(n < 10)c
% of pig
population kept in
small holdings
(n < 10)c
Numbers of
pigs kept in
smallholdings
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania 180,090 15.3 ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
548,000 25.1 ? ? ?
Kosovo 60,500* 10.6 90 10 6,050
Montenegro 27,000 10.8 75 50 13,500
North
Macedonia
196,000 15.5 78.9 4.5 8,820
Serbia 2,792,000 80.5 21.0 4.8 134,016
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Country
Number of pigs
in country
(heads)a
Pig density,
(heads/km2 of
agricultural
land)b
% of small
holdings***
(n < 10)c
% of pig
population kept in
small holdings
(n < 10)c
Numbers of
pigs kept in
smallholdings
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia 1,049,000 68.1 79.0 19 199,310
Greece 758,000 11.3 28.5 0.17 1,288
Slovenia 259,130 42.0 85 16 41,460
Median 15.5 78.9 10.0
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria 654,550 13.0 78.9 20
Romania 4,023,800 29.2 98.0** 1**
Sources: a: annual data on pig populations of Eurostat (apro_mt_lspig), December 2018.
b: Trading economics, (tradingeconomics.com).
c: National veterinary authorities of the ROC (Region of Concern) countries.
*: Provided by the Food and Veterinary Agency of the Republic of Kosovo, data available from 2017 only.
**: > 98% of the pig population in Romania are kept in herds registered as ‘backyard herds’. However, the median herd size in
these herds is 69 pigs. If only herds with ≤ 10 animals are considered backyard herds, the proportion of animals kept as
backyards is extremely low (1%).
?: Data not available.
***: Percentage of farms with ≤ 10 pigs per holding and percentage of pigs kept in those farms of all pig holding and domestic pig
population have been used as a proxy of the magnitude of the non-commercial pig sector and are referred to as smallholders.
*: > 98% of the pig population in Romania are kept in herds registered as ‘backyard herds’. However, the median
herd size in these herds is 69 pigs.
Figure 1: Pig density (heads/km2 of agricultural land) in south-eastern Europe, and the proportion of small
pig holdings with less or equal than 10 pigs per holding*, by country (red, in the pie charts)
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Some of the key characteristics of pig farming as well as additional information on pig production in
south-eastern Europe were provided by national authorities of the region, and retrieved from open
sources provided by the international organisations and projects collecting related information: The
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The Global
Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs), The Standing
Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF Committee) of the European Commission,
Eurostat and national statistical offices of the ROCs countries can be found in Table 3.
The seasonality of pig production may have a potential influence on the spread of ASF, as it could
be linked to the reproduction cycle of the pigs and also to husbandry systems in place (traditions),
which requires, as one example, that higher numbers of animals are slaughtered and moved during
festive periods. The total number of pigs in the countries of the ROC in June and December (when
available) for three consecutive years (2016–2018) is presented in Table 4. Only for the Republic of
North Macedonia, the available data showed seasonal differences in population size, with a doubling of
the population in the winter seasons. For Kosovo and Serbia, the available data showed no tendency
to seasonality, while for the other countries, data were not available for the summer season.
Table 3: Key characteristics of pig husbandry systems in south-eastern Europe
Country
Swill-
feeding is
allowed in
the country
Free-ranging pigs
present in some
areas in the
country
Home-
slaughtering is
allowed in the
country
Export/trade live
pigs to/with EU
Member States
Export/trade of
pork/products
to/with EU
Member States
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
No No Yes No**** No****
Kosovo No No Yes No**** No****
Montenegro Yes No Yes No**** No****
North
Macedonia
No Yes** Yes No**** No****
Serbia No Yes Yes No**** Yes (treated)****
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia No*** Yes Yes Yes Yes
Greece No*** Yes No Yes Yes
Slovenia No*** Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria No*** Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Romania No*** Yes** Yes Yes Yes
Source: information provided by the VAs of the countries of the ROC.
?: No data provided.
*: East-Balkan pigs.
**: Mangalita and Bazna pigs.
***: Commission Decision 2003/328/EC bans swill feeding to pigs.
****: Commission Regulation (EU) 206/2010.
Table 4: Pig population size in summer and winter months (total number of pigs in December and
June, thousand heads) in countries of south-eastern Europe
Country
2016 2017 2018
June December June December June December
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? 180,360 ? 180,090 ? ?
Bosnia and Herzegovina ? 545,000 ? 548,000 ? ?
Kosovo** 67,500 62,400 69,900 64,300 69,300 60,500
Montenegro ? 55,000 ? 25,000 ? 27,000
North Macedonia 110,000 203,000 110,000 202,000 110,000 196,000
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3.1.2. Wild boar
Wild boar distribution
No European-wide harmonised monitoring scheme currently exists to gather information on hunting
statistics. At present, each country and organisation collect hunting data using its own procedures and
acquires different types of data that are later implemented in different repositories with variable
accessibility, which hampers the comparison and common use of data across Europe for comparison
purposes (Enetwild, 2018). Detailed, harmonised information of wild boar density is desirable for risk factor
analysis (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018), but these data are currently available only on a local level, assessed
with different methodologies. Hunting bag data are currently the only Europe-wide available relative
abundance index of wild boar (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018). Wild boar relative abundance in the Balkan
countries has been provided in a report of the ENETwild Consortium (2018). This report provides recent
data on national hunting harvest results (hunting bags) for European countries. These can be transformed
into rough abundance figures by multiplying the harvest data by three (Table 5). Leranoz and Castien
(1996) calculated that the hunting harvest represents between 25% and 37% of the actual population.
Hence, multiplying the harvest by three is a conservative estimation of the (autumn–winter) population size.
Country
2016 2017 2018
June December June December June December
Serbia 3,016,000 3,021,000 2,883,000 2,911,000 2,680,000 2,792,000
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia* ? 1,163,000 ? 1,121,000 ? 1,049,000
Greece ? 743,000 ? 744,000 ? 758,000
Slovenia ? 265,700 ? 257,200 ? 259,130
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria 607,200 616,400 575,900 593,200 496,700 654,550
Romania 4,574,700 4,707,700 4,486,600 4,406,000 4,129,300 3,956,800
Source: Eurostat - Pig population - annual data [apro_mt_lspig], Last update - 17.5.19, Extracted on 19.6.19.
*: Source: Veterinary Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development, Croatia.
**: Source: The Food and Veterinary Agency of the Republic of Kosovo.
?: Information not available.
Table 5: Wild boar population density (no. of wild boar/km2 of suitable habitat) in south-eastern
European countries
Country
% of suitable wild boar
habitat in country
Average number of wild
boar/km2
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania 77.8 ?
Bosnia and Herzegovina 86 ?
Kosovo 82.5 ?
Montenegro 81.9 0.20–0.33
Macedonia 84.8 0.16–0.25
Serbia 75.3 0.47–0.75
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia 72.2 2.27–3.63
Greece 71.3 0.78–1.26
Slovenia 88.4 1.73–2.77
Median ROC 81.9 0.6–1.0
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria 76.8 0.99–1.59
Romania 68.2 0.57–0.92
Provided by ENETWILD based on hunting harvest data from each country (% of suitable habitat according to Alexander et al. 2016).
?: Data not available.
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The consortium used local hunting results and habitat modelling to predict the expected annual
wild boar harvest (Figure 2A), and this can also be calculated at the country scale. Figure 2B presents
the average wild boar habitat in the country and Figure 2C shows the comparison of countries with
more or less hunted wild boar than predicted from the habitat, with the darkest grey shading
representing those countries with more hunted wild boar than expected from the habitat quality.
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www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 14 EFSA Journal 2019;17(11):5861
A. Estimated wild boar density in the region of concern
C. Hunted wild boar in relation to the expected wild boar numbers based on wild boar habitat
B. Predicted environmental suitability (relative likelihood
of presence) for wild boar using random forest models
Hunted wild boar in relation to the expected wild boar numbers based on wild boar habitat. Values represent the
residuals of the linear regression of wild boar hunted per surface by the predicted environmental suitability. Positive
residuals indicate countries where the number of wild boar hunted is higher than expected given habitat
characteristics, and vice versa.
Figure 2: Wild boar in the ROC: (A) estimated mean population density per country; (B) habitat
suitability; (C) hunted wild boar in correlation to the habitat quality (Provided by EnetWild
consortium; see description methodology in ENETWILD, 2019)
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According to Figure 2C, which illustrates predicted vs. actual numbers of hunted wild boar in
Europe, some countries in the EU are far above the mean (Czechia, France, Germany, Hungary),
implicating that their wild boar densities are higher than expected based on the habitat. These are
countries where the wild boar population is already reaching the upper end of the habitat carrying
capacity, or the carrying capacity is higher than expected due to feeding or due to crops that favour
wild boar proliferation. By contrast, countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark,
Moldova, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine, some of which are in or close to the ROC, are hunting less wild
boar than predicted by the suitable wild boar habitat, i.e. their wild boar populations are expected to
grow in the next years if this is not counteracted by significant intervention.
Wild boar hunting and feeding policy
In addition to wild boar density or relative wild boar abundance, a number of other factors may
play a role in ASF spread, including wild boar hunting and additional feeding policies.
Table 6 provides information on wild boar hunting and feeding policy in south-eastern Europe, as
provided by the National competent authorities, including (1) the presence of fenced hunting estates
(where wild boar are fed all year round); (2) whether wild boar feeding occurs outside fenced hunting
estates; and (3) whether baiting for hunting is common practice.
To reduce the probability of spread through wild boar, preventive measures to reduce the wild boar
carrying capacity of wild boar habitat (feeding bans + limiting wild boar access to attractive crops such
as maize), along with actions to increase the annual wild boar hunting harvest (aiming at > 65% of
the estimated population) are recommended.
As mentioned in Table 6, hunting tourism is one of the factors influencing the risk of spread of ASF.
The number of hunting permits can be used as an indicator of this activity. Data on the number of
permits issued to foreign hunters in 2018 and 2019 hunting seasons were provided only by the
Croatian Ministry of Agriculture. Figure 3 shows the number of hunting permits issued in 2018. More
details are presented in Appendix B.
Table 6: Wild boar hunting and feeding policy in south-eastern European countries
Country
Fenced hunting
estates present
(fed wild boar all
year round)
WB feeding
outside fenced
hunting estates
practice
Baiting for
hunting is
common
practice
Preventive
measures to
decrease WB
population
Hunting
tourism* from
other country
allowed
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania No No No No No
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Yes Yes No No Yes
Kosovo No Yes Yes No Yes
Montenegro No Yes No No No
North
Macedonia
No Yes No No** Yes
Serbia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Greece No No No Yes No
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria Yes No No Yes Yes
Romania Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Source: provided and validated by the VAs of the countries of the ROC.
*: Hunting tourism: = ‘Yes’ means people outside the country are allowed to hunt.
**: New legislation in process of adoption.
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3.1.3. Connectedness
Trade of live pigs and pork
Under EU rules, there is limited trade of live pigs and fresh or frozen pig meat from third countries
to EU Member States. No trade of live pigs or pork products is permitted from the non-EU Member
States of the ROC to all EU MSs. A list of countries approved to export treated pork products to the EU
is provided in Commission Regulation (EU) 206/2010. To protect the EU single market and
international trade the movement of live pigs, pork or wild boar products from EU areas under disease
ASF restrictions, is regulated by Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709/EU. This regulation
prohibits the dispatch of live pigs, live wild boar, pork and wild boar products from the restricted areas
and yet provides derogations under certain strict conditions, including testing or processing depending
on the category of the areas (which are listed in the annex to the implementing act). Therefore, all
data below refer to the legal trade taking place under these animal health movement restrictions and
control measures (see Section 3.1.5 for the Legislative framework, and the trade restrictions).
Data from two databases, Eurostat (Eurostat’s External Trade database) and TRACES, were
retrieved to assess flows of live pigs, pork products and volumes of goods shipped. The number of
pigs made over the last 3 years (2016–2018) reported to and the total volume of pork and pork
products (100 kg) for 2016–2018 extracted from Eurostat were used as complementary indicators of
pig and pork products trade activity in each country. The numbers of live pigs traded between the EU
MSs in the ROC and the rest of the EU in 2016–2018 is presented in Table 7.
Figure 3: Number of permits issued by the Croatian Ministry of Agriculture to foreign hunters in 2018
and 2019
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As can be seen in Table 7 from the large numbers of pigs traded between the EU MSs, only a small
share originates from the three EU MS in the ROC, of which the most important share originates from
Croatia (between 2016 and 2018, on average 0.52% of the total intra-EU pig movements originated
from Croatia). More detailed information on the numbers of live pigs moved between the EU MSs can
be found in the activity reports reported by TRACES (2016, 2017 and 2018). It should be noted that
trade of life pigs from non-EU MSs is not in the scope of TRACES, and these data were therefore not
provided in Table 7.
Also, intra-European trade of pork products is not in the scope of TRACES. However, the volumes of
pork/pork products that are moved from restricted areas are reported to TRACES, and are given in
Appendix B.
Table 8 shows the volumes of pork and pork products traded from the EU MSs in the ROC reported
to Eurostat. As can be seen in Table 8, the trade of pork products from the EU MSs in the ROC to the
other countries in the ROC is minimal, and the share of the trade from the three MS in the ROC in the
intra-EU trade is minimal.
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Table 7: Sum of live pigs traded for different purposes from 3 EU MS in the ROC to the 28 EU MSs in 2016–2018, reported to TRACES
ORIGIN Slaughter Production Breeding Other purposes Total (all purposes)
Share intra-EU
pig trade (%)
CROATIA (HR) 496,391 23,949 3,383 1 523,724 0.517839
GREECE (EL) 1,386 293 1,641 0 3,320 0.003283
SLOVENIA (SI) 6,053 325 269 0 6,647 0.006572
EU 28 TOTAL 27,651,948 70,677,932 2,806,559 110 101,136,549
Table 8: Sum of trade of pork and pork products from EU MS in the ROC to the 28 EU MS and the other countries in the ROC in 2016–2018 (100 kg)
Destination
Origin Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Croatia Greece Montenegro North Macedonia Serbia Kosovo Slovenia EU28
CROATIA (HR) 0 64,398 0 179 9,219 7,194 33,369 0 207,150 309,771
GREECE (EL) 3,996 0 91 0 0 817 18,334 0 8 291,860
SLOVENIA (SI) 446 12,032 82,356 0 127,724 4,652 41,481 28 0 156,445
Total of HR+ EL+SI 4,442 76,430 82,447 179 136,943 12,663 93,184 28 207,158 758,076
EU 28 149,254 456,573 2,780,141 6,394,244 648,601 293,701 1,105,204 2,128 1,748,244 230,998,856
Grand total 153,696 533,003 2,862,588 6,394,423 785,544 306,364 1,198,388 2,156 1,955,402 231,756,932
Source: Eurostat: data set ‘INTERNATIONAL TRADE’/EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2, 4, 6 and CN8 (DS-045409). The product (HS/CN) codes used were: 0203, 020630, 020641, 020649, 020910,
021011, 021012, 021019, 160241, 160242, 160249, 16029051.
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The movement of people
The movement of people is of potential relevance to ASF spread, given the potential of people to
illegally move pork or pork products, including hunting trophies, wild boar meat and products thereof
from affected areas. Three different aspects of people movement, within the ROC and from the ROC
to non-affected MSs, are considered, including labour migration, the movement of refugees and
economic migrants, and tourism within the Western Balkans. When referring to migration from
non-EU countries of the ROC to the EU, the term ‘western Balkan countries’ is frequently used;
according to the World Bank, the countries of the western Balkans include Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia (World Bank, 2018).
Labour migration patterns
There have been high levels of outward migration of people from the western Balkans for many
years, continuing a tradition of temporary labour migration that has existed for centuries (Vermeulen
et al., 2015). A substantial proportion of people from each of the Western Balkans countries live and
work abroad (Figures 4 and 5).
According to UN Statistics (Western Balkans Labour Market Trends, 2018), as for 2015, almost half
of all emigrants from the Western Balkans countries moved to the EU-15 (Figure 5), including 84% of
all Albanian emigrants (particularly to Greece and Italy), about 60% of emigrants from Kosovo
(particularly to Germany) and 51 percent of Serbian emigrants (particularly to Austria and Germany).
Croatian Bureau of Statistics reports that 63.9% of Croatian emigrants in 2017 moved to Germany.
Figure 4: Emigration-share-to-resident population, 1990–2017 (Source: Western Balkans Labor
Market Trends, 2018)
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The strong linkages between the western Balkan countries and the European Union are clearly
demonstrated in Figures 6 and 7 showing the acquisition of EU citizenship by citizens of Western
Balkan countries and the remittance flows from EU member states to Western Balkan
countries. Remittances refer to cross-border, person-to-person payments of relatively low value via
money transfer operators. The transfers are typically recurrent payments by migrant workers to their
relatives in their home countries.
There is also substantial, irregular and seasonal migration of people within the western
Balkans region, both from other countries in the western Balkans and from elsewhere. Of all migrant
labour in Montenegro and Croatia, the majority originates from within the region, mostly from
neighbouring countries (Serbia and Bosnia, Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo). In
Montenegro, 42.8% of foreign workers come from Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina
(22.5%), North Macedonia (7.2%) and Kosovo (3%). Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina report a high,
but declining proportion of regional migrants, mainly from Serbia (70%) and Croatia (20%). In contrast,
Figure 5: Main destination countries for Western Balkan emigrants, share in %, 2015 (Source:
Western Balkans Labour Market Trends, 2018)
Figure 6: Acquisition of EU citizenship by citizens
of Western Balkan countries in 2017
(Eurostat)
Figure 7: Remittance flows from EU Member
States to countries of the Western
Balkans during 2017 (World Bank)
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in Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, about 80% of labour migrants come from outside the
South East Europe (SEE) region (Labour Mobility as a Factor of Development in South-East Europe).
The most significant illegal border-crossings of citizens of the Western Balkans countries occurred in
the south of the region and related to seasonal movements of workers from Albania to Greece and
back (Frontex. Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2018).
Refugees and economic migrants
The western Balkans has been an important transit route (the ‘Western Balkan route’) for refugees
and economic migrants to the EU, mainly from the Middle East and North Africa (Delauney, 2015). The
route was officially closed in 2016 following support from the European Union to Turkey for registered
refugees, principally from Syria (European Commission, 2016). Nonetheless, migrant flows have
continued to some extent but with a changing pattern of movement, as demonstrated by the
thousands of irregular entries into Bosnia–Herzegovina from Serbia and Montenegro since the
beginning of 2018 (Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2018).
Tourism within the ROC
The ROC countries are increasingly important tourist destinations (Table 9). Compared with the
preceding year, there was a 15% increase in tourist numbers in 2016 to Bosnia and Herzegovina, of
13% to Serbia, of 8% to Albania, of 7% to Montenegro and 5% to North Macedonia (European Union
Tourism Trends, 2017). The ‘Western Balkans Cultural Heritage Route’, a series of initiatives and events
supported by the European Union and its Member States, was established in 2018 to connect sites and
highlight the European Union’s support to the preservation of culture in the region (European Union
External Action, 2018).
3.1.4. Societal context
Human population and poverty
Poverty can be measured in a number of different ways. The at risk of poverty is used here,
reflecting the percentage of people on a low income in that country. It does not measure wealth or
poverty, nor does it necessarily imply a low standard of living (Eurostat, 2019). In technical terms, at
risk of poverty is defined as the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (total
household income, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or saving, divided by
the number of household members converted into equalised adults) below the at risk of poverty
threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income after social
transfers (Table 10).
Table 9: Arrivals of non-residents staying in hotels and similar establishments (thousand), 2017
Country Thousand individuals Source
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania 5,926.2 Institute of Statistics (Albania)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 870.0 Eurostat
Kosovo 86.0 Eurostat
Montenegro 794.8 Eurostat
North Macedonia 600.9 Eurostat
Serbia 1,335.6 Eurostat
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia 15,581.7 Eurostat
Greece 17,929.0 Eurostat
Slovenia 8,572.2 Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia
Median ROC 1,335.6
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria 3,655.8 Eurostat
Romania 2,749.3 Eurostat
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Pork consumption
Annual pork consumption per capita is the indirect indicator of the role of pork products in food
provision, pork production and trade in a country. The median pork consumption in the ROC in 2013
is of 26.8 kg per year shown in Table 11. This is much lower than median annual pork consumption
(39 kg per year) in the EU28.
Table 10: Human population density, rural population, unemployment rate and people at risk of
poverty or social exclusion, 2017
Country
Human population density
(persons per km2)a
Rural population, % of
total populationb
Unemployment
rate, %c
At risk of
poverty, %d
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania 105.0 41.6 13.7 25.0*
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
68.7 60.6 20.7 16.9
Kosovo 167 62.0 30.3 ?
Montenegro 45.7 35.8 16.1 31.0
North
Macedonia
83.0 41.8 22.4 41.6
Serbia 80.7 44.3 13.6 36.7
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia 73.9 40.7 10.2 26.4
Greece 82.2 21.7 18.0 34.8
Slovenia 102.6 50.4 8.6 17.1
Median ROC 82.5 41.8 16.1 31.0
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria 64.3 25.7 6.2 38.9
Romania 83.6 45.2 3.8 35.7
?: no data.
Sources: Eurostat: a – [TPS00003], b – https://tradingeconomics.com, c – Eurostat [cpc_pslm], d – Erostat [ilc_peps01].
*– 2016 in : A Survey on Poverty in Albania: Comparison between Rural and Urban.
Table 11: Pork consumption per capita, 2013, in the region of concern
Country Kg
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania 10.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9.4
Kosovo ?
North Macedonia 10.4
Montenegro 53
Serbia 32
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia 42.8
Greece 28.3
Slovenia 28.2
Median ROC 26.8
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Bulgaria 9.5
Romania 25.3
Source: https://ourworldindata.org/
?: no data available.
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3.1.5. Preparedness and response activities
This section presents a summary of information provided by the VAs adding information to: (1) a
survey carried out by the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal
Diseases (GF-TADs)4 as part of 11th Meeting of Standing Group of Experts on ASF (SGE ASF)5 held in
Warsaw Poland on 24–25 September 2018; and (2) presentations of country representatives at an
Inception workshop organised by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) held in Belgrade (18–19
February 2019). Specific to laboratory capacity, additional information was provided by the European
Union Reference Laboratory for ASF (EURL).6 Subsequently, EFSA analysed and presented these data
in tables, and the VAs were asked to verify and update this information. Data collated in relation to the
ASF situation in Albania were not validated by the Albanian VAs and consequently had to be omitted
from this opinion.
Legislative framework
The European Commission issued in 1992 the Council Directive 92/119/EEC introducing general
measures for the control of certain animal diseases, but this only included general measures for swine
vesicular disease, not for ASF. In 2002, Council Directive 2002/60/EC included ASF into List A of 92/119/
EEC and amended the measures concerning ASF, therefore constituting the main EU legislation laying
down the measures and activities to control and prevent further spread of the disease.
The incursion and evolution of ASF into the EU brought about the need for specific additional animal
health movement restrictions and regionalised control measures tailored to the characteristics of
the epidemic and the characteristics of the areas where the disease emerges. The issuing of
Implementing Decisions in response to the evolution of the diseases can be easily amended or replaced
and are directly implemented and adopted by the MSs. A series of these Implementing Decisions
repealing or amending the earlier one is issued as a common practice for many diseases. Regarding ASF,
the Implementing Decision 2014/178/EU repealed by 2014/709/EU issued in 2014 has been amended
several times following the evolution of the disease, and lately amended by Commission Implementing
Decision 2019/1392.
The existing EU animal health legislative framework (Table A.1, in Appendix A) outlines compulsory
measures and activities to: (1) prevent the introduction of a pathogen agent in a territory (EU, country,
region, area) through border checks and veterinary checks for the single market; (2) eliminate the
sources of the pathogen; (3) stop or control the further spread and (4) eradicate the disease. The
guidelines and the supportive documents also provide detailed information to the authorities and to the
stakeholders to better understand and implement the measures (Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A).
EU MSs within the ROC (Croatia, Greece and Slovenia) have integrated relevant EU legislation into
their national legislation and are obliged to follow any mandate or recommendation of the EU. The
non-EU countries of the ROC (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Republic of North Macedonia,
Montenegro and Serbia) that are included to the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) have
started to harmonise their national legislation related to animal diseases with the EU legislation. Most
of these have already completed this process while Kosovo is currently only partially in compliance with
EU legislation.
In terms of the regionalisation for ASF (under Implementing Decisions 2014/178; 2014/709 and
2019/1247), there is a working document (7112/2015) to support the regionalisation process, which
details the criteria used to determine the size of the regions.
Laboratory capacity
The European Commission has issued the diagnostic manual of ASF through Commission Decision
2003/422/EC, describing the diagnostic techniques for the detection of ASFV that must be implemented
by the MSs (see Table 13) on the Legislative framework. Moreover, The Manual of Diagnostic Tests and
Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals of the OIE provides a harmonised approach to ASF disease diagnosis by
4 The Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) launched in 2004, is a joint
initiative of OIE and FAO to achieve the prevention and control of transboundary animal diseases.
5 An initiative called Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in Europe (SGE ASF) was established under the GF-TADs
umbrella to build closer cooperation and transparency among countries affected by ASF and countries at risk, including a
harmonised strategy of risk mitigation measures.
6 EU Reference Laboratories: https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/official_controls/legislation/ref-labs_en
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describing internationally agreed laboratory diagnostic techniques (Table A.3). The EU Reference
Laboratory (EURL) for ASF provides technical and scientific support to National Reference Laboratories
(NRL)7 and organises training activities and ring trials for diagnostic methods among the laboratories.
An overview of laboratory capacity in the countries within the ROC, based on the information
received from different sources,8,9,10 is presented in Table 12.
7 Regulation 882/2004 Article 33 on National Reference Laboratories: https://efsa815.sharepoint.com/:w:/r/sites/AHAWAfrica
nswinefever/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc={bad2f0f8-4587-4d2d-9acd-e0c49570ca15}&action=edit&wdPid=2791f641
8 Results of Survey: 11th Meeting of Standing Group of Experts (GF-TADS) on ASF: http://web.oie.int/RR-Europe/eng/eng/
Regprog/docs/docs/SGE%20ASF11/SGE%20ASF11%20(Warsaw,%20Sept%202018)%20%%20Plavsic_ASF%20Preparedness%
20in%20Balkans.pdf
9 The presentations of the countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) participated to
the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Inception workshop held in Belgrade (18–19 February 2019) available here.
10 Information received from the EURL for ASF.
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Table 12: Laboratory capacity of the countries of the ROC
Country
Type of ASFV
detection
method
available
Maximum
No. of blood
samples per
day in the
Country
Ring test
(Year/results)
Training
the last
2 years
Self -assessment of the Countries as it came up through the OIE-GFTADS
survey(a) to the relevant questions
Perception of the Countries for
the capacity of their NRL
Perception of the Countries for their
compliance with the GF-TADS
recommendations(b) on laboratory
diagnostics
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Serology 350–400 – Yes The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Only partially
C- PCR 10 –
RT-PCR 110 –
Kosovo ELISA 800 – Yes Only partially
PCR 50 –
Montenegro Serology 400 – Yes The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Yes, fully
RT-PCR 30 –
North
Macedonia
Serology 400–600 2018/Satisfactory NO The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Yes, fully
C-PCR 60–80 2018/Satisfactory
RT-PCR 70–100 2018/Satisfactory
Serbia ELISA + IPT 5200 2019/Satisfactory Yes The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Yes, fully
C-PCR 500 2019/Satisfactory
RT-PCR 600 2019/Satisfactory
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Country
Type of ASFV
detection
method
available
Maximum
No. of blood
samples per
day in the
Country
Ring test
(Year/results)
Training
the last
2 years
Self -assessment of the Countries as it came up through the OIE-GFTADS
survey(a) to the relevant questions
Perception of the Countries for
the capacity of their NRL
Perception of the Countries for their
compliance with the GF-TADS
recommendations(b) on laboratory
diagnostics
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia ELISA (Ag+ Ab) 2800 2019/Satisfactory Yes The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Yes, fully
C-PCR 25 2019/Satisfactory
RT -PCR 300 2019/Satisfactory
Greece ELISA + IPT 100 2019/Satisfactory Yes The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Yes, fully
C-PCR 6 2019/Satisfactory
RT-PCR 12 2019/Satisfactory
Slovenia ELISA + IPT+
IB
1000–1700
(IB = 22-36)
2019/Satisfactory Yes The NRL is able to produce rapid and
reliable diagnostic, in accordance with
OIE standards
Only partially
RT-PCR &
C-PCR
15–30 2019/Satisfactory
*: C-PCR: conventional polymerase chain reaction; IB: immunoblotting; IPT: indirect immunoperoxidase test; RT-PCR: real-time polymerase chain reaction; OIE: use of OIE standard method.
?: Information not available.
(a): Results of the Survey: 11th Meeting of Standing Group of Experts (GF-TADS) on ASF: http://web.oie.int/RREurope/eng/eng/Regprog/docs/docs/SGE%20ASF11/SGE%20ASF11%20(Warsaw,%
20Sept%202018)%20-%20Plavsic_ASF%20Preparedness%20in%20Balkans.pdf
(b): All the recommendation are available on the web site of Standing Group of Experts on ASF under the GF-TADS umbrella.
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Awareness campaigns and training activities
Risk communication of animal diseases such as ASF is crucial for prevention, control and
eradication. The benefits of a well-designed and complete communication strategy are related not only
to an effective passive surveillance system for the early detection of the disease, but also to an
effective response from VAs.
Within EU, the responsibility of the MS to raise such awareness with respect to ASF is described in
the strategic approach to the management of ASF for the EU (SANTE/7113/2015 - Rev 10). VAs play a
significant role in organising such awareness campaigns and training activities within their countries.
For transboundary diseases, like ASF, there are additional international initiatives to enhance this effort
under the umbrella of EC, EFSA, OIE, GF-TADS and FAO.
Several awareness campaigns for ASF are already in place in the ROC (Table 13), according to the
replies of the countries. Some countries have focused only on key stakeholders, while some others
have extended the campaigns further to all relevant stakeholders who might come into contact with
live animals susceptible to ASF (DP, WB) or their products (e.g. farmers, hunters, wildlife managers,
custom services, animal transporters, livestock market staff and travellers).
A range of different tools is being used to disseminate information related to ASF, such as posters,
leaflets, instructions, manuals, the media (TV, radio) and the websites of the authorities. Workshops
and meetings are also being held with stakeholders and veterinarians. In addition, the EU MSs in the
ROC are obliged to show posters at entry points as foreseen by Regulation 206/2009 as well as per
Article 15a of Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709.
The capacity of the VAs to deal with ASF either at the level of prevention or occurrence is based on
three main pillars: the legislative framework in place, training and resources. The legislative framework
in relation to ASF has been described above (Section 3.1.5) and in Appendix A (Table A.2).
Although resources remain a standing and sustained demand in every domain, in the case of
epidemics, the availability of resources is a critical prerequisite for the VA at all levels of prevention,
control, eradication. Limited resources will contribute to further spread of the diseases, as it constrains
both the preparedness and response of the VA.
In relation to training, the VA staff need suitable knowledge and qualifications to enable an
effective intervention (Table 14). This can be ensured by participation in training activities covering
relevant domains and objectives, either organised at a national level or by international organisations
such as EC (BTSF, Better Training for Safer Food11), FAO, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
or the EURL for ASF.
Awareness campaigns for travellers, hunter, farmers etc. should be further encouraged in the ROC,
in order to limit the risk of spread via movements of people, as well as to increase the probability of
early detection. Furthermore, regular repetitions and changes of awareness campaigns are
recommended in order to maintain awareness.
Training activities for VA staff, other competent authorities and hunters should be organised
frequently and cover all relevant ASF topics in order to increase the probability of early detection and
effective control. This is especially important, as seven out of nine countries within the ROC felt that
they have insufficient training of the VA staff.
Table 13: Awareness campaigns in countries within the ROC
Country
Awareness
campaign in
place for
Year
started
Means/tools used
Perception of the Countries for
their Compliance with the GF-
TADS recommendations(a) on
risk communication strategy(b)
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Some key
stakeholders
2016 In preparation stage Partially
Kosovo(c) Some key
stakeholders
2017 Meetings Partially
11 Better Training for Safer Food (BTSF) is a Commission training initiative covering food and feed law, animal health and welfare
and plant health rules.
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Country
Awareness
campaign in
place for
Year
started
Means/tools used
Perception of the Countries for
their Compliance with the GF-
TADS recommendations(a) on
risk communication strategy(b)
Montenegro Some key
stakeholders
2018 Manuals, leaflets, media
(television), ASFVPA website,
workshops, TAIEX
Partially
North
Macedonia
All stakeholders 2018 Leaflets, brochure/guidelines on
biosecurity measures in pigs,
trainings
Partially
Serbia Some key
stakeholders
2017 Manuals leaflets, posters,
website, media (news, radio,
television)
Partially
ROC (EU MSs)**
Croatia All stakeholders* 2018 Official documents, posters,
leaflets, website of the Ministry,
workshops, meetings with
stakeholders and hunters, media
Fully
Greece All stakeholders 2016 Official documents, posters,
leaflets, workshops, meetings
with stakeholders and hunters,
website of the Ministry (http://
www.minagric.gr/index.php/el/
for-farmer-2/animal-production/
pigs/1126-asthenxoiron)
Fully
Slovenia All stakeholders 2016 Leaflets, posters, media (web
pages, news, radio, television),
website designated to ASF
(www.afriskaprasicjakuga.si),
workshops for hunters and vets
Fully
?: Information not available.
*: ‘All stakeholders’, according to the relevant question in GF-TADS survey, it refers to farmers, hunters, wild animal managers,
custom services, transporters, livestock markets and travellers.
**: Article 15a of Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709 Information obligations for MSs.
(a): All the recommendations are available on the web site of Standing Group of Experts on ASF under the GF-TADS umbrella.
(b): Results of the Survey: 11th Meeting of Standing Group of Experts (GF-TADS) on ASF: http://web.oie.int/RREurope/eng/eng/
Regprog/docs/docs/SGE%20ASF11/SGE%20ASF11%20(Warsaw,%20Sept%202018)%20-%20Plavsic_ASF%20Preparedness
%20in%20Balkans.pdf
(c): Territory (this designation is without prejudice to position on status, and is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99
and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence).
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Table 14: Training activities on ASF that have taken place the last 2 years in different countries in ROC for the staff of Veterinary Authorities and
stakeholders
Country
Training on
procedures at
infected premises
within protection
and surveillance
zones
Training on
procedures at
local disease
control
centres
Training on
procedures at
the national
disease
control
centres
Training on
tracing and
keeping
records
Training on procedures for
the notification of the
disease (national level,
international level,
communication with the
public)
Training on
sampling
procedures;
specifically, on
wild boars
Training on
the
procedures to
be followed in
the field
National
training
activities in
place for the
stakeholders
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Partially
Kosovo Yes No No No No No No Partially
Montenegro Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially
North
Macedonia
No No No No Yes No No Partially
Serbia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Fully
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Partially
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially
?: Information not available.
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Compensation policy for farmers
For animal diseases, such as ASF, control strategies are based on drastic measures with an impact
on trade and the rural economy, such as culling of all animals in affected premises and trade
restrictions for live animals and their products. To ensure compliance with the regulations and to
reduce socioeconomic impact, timely and efficient compensation mechanisms for economic losses
incurred by animal owners are crucial.
An overview of compensation policies in place in the countries within the ROC is shown in Table 15.
Moreover, the European Commission provides financial support to MSs to eradicate, control and
prevent various animal diseases, including for emergency measures according to the Regulation (EU)
No 652/2014. Specific measures are co-funded through: (i) National Veterinary Programmes for the
eradication, control and surveillance of animal diseases and zoonoses (veterinary programmes) and (ii)
Emergency measures.
A compensation mechanism is in place, which covers the value of culled animals, but not indirect
losses, in all countries within the ROC.
Communication and cooperation between authorities
Cooperation among countries, including the exchange of information, plays a key role in better
understanding ASF epidemiology, and in implementing timely and appropriate measures for prevention
and control. To this end, many initiatives have been developed to enhance communication and
cooperation between national authorities. The Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) developed
by the European Commission and the World Animal Health Information Database (WAHIS) developed
by OIE are digital applications that enable immediate notification and information about contagious
animal disease outbreaks, including ASF. The notification of the outbreaks of listed diseases in ADNS is
compulsory for EU countries according to Council Directive 82/894/EEC (as last amended by
Commission Implementing Decision 2012/737/EU). The standing Group of Experts on African swine fe
ver in Europe (SGE ASF) was set up to build up a closer cooperation among countries affected by ASF
and thereby address the disease in a more collaborative and harmonised manner across Europe.
The SGE ASF Europe is a unique opportunity to engage affected countries into a fruitful regional
dialogue and increased transparency. The GF-TADs offers the ideal framework to discuss common/
harmonized mitigation measures based on scientific and technical grounds only.
Table 15: Compensation policy for ASF in the countries within the ROC
Country
Level of compensation
(percentage of the
value of the animals
killed)
Time interval between
culling and compensation
Compensation for indirect loss
of the production due to the
shutdown of the
establishments (empty stable
period)
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
100% or more 30–60 days No
Kosovo(a) from 75 to 100% 30 days No
Montenegro 100% or more 30 days No
North
Macedonia
100% or more 30 days* No
Serbia 100% or more 30 days No
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Up to 100% 60 days No
Greece 100% or more 60 days No
Slovenia 100% or more Not specified, reasonable time No
?: Information not available.
*: From the submission of the official request for compensation.
(a): This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the
Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
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To ensure efficient prevention and control of ASF, active collaboration between the VAs and other
competent authorities and stakeholders is needed. Given the role of WB in the current epidemic of ASF
in Europe, authorities responsible for the environment, wildlife and hunting are particularly important
(SANTE/7113/2015 - Rev 10). The transboundary nature of the disease, and the role that human
activities play for long distance and cross border spread implies a need for engagement also of custom
and border control services. The involvement of organisations and associations of farmers and hunters
are also crucial. An overview of communication and cooperation between authorities and stakeholders
within and between the countries within the ROC is summarised in Table 16.
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Table 16: Communication and cooperation among the different national authorities and cross border cooperation between the countries within the ROC.
The table has been filled in with the information received from OIE/GFTADS survey
Country
Active cooperation
with farmers and
other food business
operators
Active
cooperation with
hunters and
authorities for
wildlife
Active
cooperation
with Customs
and other
Services
Perception of the Countries for
their Compliance with the GF-
TADS recommendations(a) on
cooperation with
Cross Border Cooperation
hunting and
wild
management
organisations
customs officials
on coordinated
border
management
Cooperation
with the
neighbouring
countries
Follow
activities of
EC, OIE and
FAO
Notification to
WAHIS and to
ADNS
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Yes Yes Yes Partially Partially Yes Yes No
Kosovo Yes Yes Yes Partially Fully Yes Yes Partially
Montenegro Yes Yes Yes Fully Fully Yes Yes Fully
North
Macedonia
Yes Yes Yes Fully Fully Yes Yes Fully
Serbia Yes Yes Yes Fully Fully Yes Yes Fully
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Yes Yes Yes Fully Fully Yes Yes Fully
Greece Yes Yes Yes Fully Fully Yes Yes Fully
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Fully Fully Yes Yes Fully
?: Information not available.
(a): All the recommendation are available on the website of Standing Group of Experts on ASF under the GF-TADS umbrella.
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Contingency plans
For rapid and efficient control and eradication of ASF, national CPs are needed in order to ensure
the high level of preparedness and rapid response to an occurrence (Council Directive 2002/60/EC, Re
gulation 2016/429). The CP should clearly describe the procedures and the flow of commands to be
followed and should include guidelines or manuals with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to
support any person or competent authority involved.
Regular updates are needed to ensure that the plans adapt to the epidemiological situation of the
disease and remain in compliance with recommended control measures. In addition, it is important
that regular simulation exercises are carried out.
An overview of CP in place in the countries within the ROC is shown in Table 17.
Registration and identification system for domestic pig population and animal movements
Registration and identification systems are very important tools for risk assessment and disease
management. They provide information that is essential for epidemiological investigations and allow
forward- and backward-tracing of animal movements and animal products. The more detailed and
digitalised they are, the more effective is their contribution to the management of the diseases and the
epidemiological investigation. According to Council Directive 2008/71/EC and to the Commission Dec
isions 2000/678/EC, the development of these systems is a legal requirement for the MS of EU. In
addition, it is a requirement for EU pre-accession countries.
An overview of registration and identification systems in place in the countries within the ROC can
be seen in Table 18 below. Few countries within the ROC had either no movement registrations (one
country), no contingency plan (two countries), incomplete NRL capacity (one country), or insufficient
surveillance (two countries). These deficiencies should be improved, as the first three reduce the
effectiveness of controlling disease, while the last one decreases the probability of early detection as
well as the effectiveness of control.
Table 17: Contingency plans for ASF of the countries of ROC
Country
CP in place
and integrated
in national
legislation
Specific manuals
and SOPs were
developed for
the CP
CP updated
the last 2
years
Simulation
exercise for
ASF CP
Disease control centres
appointed by CP and
functional
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Yes No Yes No At national and regional
level
Kosovo Yes Yes Yes No At national level
Montenegro No Yes No No No
North
Macedonia
Yes Yes Yes No At national and regional
level
Serbia Yes Yes Yes Yes At national and regional
level
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Yes Yes Yes No At national and regional
level
Greece Yes Yes No No At national and regional
level
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes No At national level
?: Information not available.
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Table 18: The registration and identification systems of the domestic pig population of each country within the ROC
Country
Digital national
database for the
registration of
domestic pig
population
Registration of
pig farms with
unique
identification
code
Registration of
the number of
pigs in farms
by census
Frequency of
census
Registration of
pigs with
individual
identification
code
Registration of
domestic pig
movements in
the national
database
Official health
certificate
accompanies the
dispatches
(issued by
official
authorities)
Movement
notification
document
accompanies
the dispatches
(issued by the
owner of the
animals)
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Not at national but
only at local level
Yes Yes* Once a year* Yes No Yes No
Kosovo Yes Yes – – Yes Yes Yes Yes
Montenegro Yes Yes Yes Twice a year Yes Yes Yes Yes
North Macedonia Yes Yes Yes Twice a year ** Yes Yes Yes*** No
Serbia Yes Yes Yes During
registration
Yes Partially Yes No
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Yes Yes Yes Once a year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes Yes Once a year Yes
(reproductive
population)
Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Once a year Yes Yes No/Yes**** Yes
?: Information not available.
*: During vaccination for CSF.
**: Normally once a year but due to the ASF threat twice a year.
***: Issued by the PVPs under contract with CA.
****: No for internal movements but yes for dispatches outside the Country.
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Surveillance activities
As ASF is a notifiable disease, passive surveillance in DP and in WB is a legal obligation and is in
place in the south-eastern European countries. Passive surveillance mainly concerns the laboratory
analysis conducted on WB found dead, and may or may not include road kills, and on DP with clinical
signs similar to ASF. In some countries, active surveillance is also in place, including systematic
(random or risk-based) sampling and laboratory analysis of DP or hunted WB.
An overview of surveillance activities carried out during 2018 in the countries with the ROC can be
seen in Table 19. All the results were negative for ASF.
Surveillance activities, especially passive surveillance of wild boar and domestic pigs, should be
reinforced in the ROC as it remains the most effective means for early detection of ASF, benchmarking
should be considered, to determine a threshold of the minimum number of wild boar found dead to be
tested. Timely intervention to prevent ASF spread to non-affected areas within the ROC, as well as
from the ROC to non-affected EU MS outside the ROC, is highly dependent on early detection and
effective control of the disease.
4. Assessment
4.1. Risk of spread of African swine fever in the south-eastern countries
of Europe
4.1.1. Potential spread of ASF in the region of concern after possible introduction
4.1.1.1. Indicators related to spread of ASF in domestic pig populations
Since 2007, most of the ASF outbreaks in Europe have occurred in smallholdings. This could be a
consequence of poor biosecurity conditions and other inherent features, including the use of swill-
feeding (illegal in the EU), illegal animal movements, collections of backyard pigs in markets, home-
slaughtering, outdoor keeping and possible contacts to other pigs or feral pigs (Jori and Bastos, 2009;
Costard et al., 2013a; Guinat et al., 2016). Moreover, the surveillance of smallholder farms by
veterinary authorities is more difficult than surveillance of commercial farms, which generally have high
biosecurity levels and good recording of animal and people movements in the farm or purchases of
feed or services. This is illustrated by the conclusions in the audit report of the European Commission
Table 19: Surveillance activities in place during 2018 in ROC
Country
Passive Surveillance in 2018 Active Surveillance in 2018
Wild Boar
(found dead)
Domestic Pig
(clinical suspected)
Wild Boar
(hunted)
Domestic Pig
In
place
No. of
animals
tested
In
place
No. of
animals
tested
No. of the
suspicious
farms
In
place
No. of
animals
tested
In
place
No. of
animals
tested
No. of
farms
sampled
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania Yes 0 Yes 0
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Partially 1 Partially 0 0 Partially 73 – – –
Kosovo Yes 0 Yes 0 0 No – No – –
Montenegro Partially 0 Yes 9 – Yes 303 No – –
North
Macedonia
Yes 0 Yes 2 1 Yes 0 No – –
Serbia Yes 25 Yes – – Yes 703 Yes – –
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia Yes 19 Yes 66 3 Yes 1,500 No – –
Greece Yes 4 Yes 0 0 No – No – –
Slovenia Yes 66 Yes 1 1 Yes 365 Yes 340 253
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(DG (SANTE) 2018-6700), which stated that the lack of effective traceability, which generally prevails
in the smallholder farms in Romania, contributed to the spread of ASF in that country.
The high percentage of smallholders (78.9%, see Table 2) in the domestic pig sector is a very
important indicator contributing to the potential spread of ASF within the ROC. From the countries with
data available on the numbers of animals in pig herds, it is clear that smallholder pig production is a
key feature of pig production throughout south-eastern Europe, representing most pig holdings in all
countries except in Greece and Serbia. The percentage of smallholders in the ROC (Table 2) is high,
with a median of the 78.9% of pig farms with less or equal than 10 animals per herd in the ROC. In
Serbia, the pig density is high with approximately 80.5 pigs per km2 of agricultural land on average.
The agricultural sector in this country is characterised by small family farms raising livestock mainly for
home consumption. Although only 21% of the pig herds have less or equal than 10 animals, the
absolute number of pigs kept in smallholder farms in Serbia is substantial (about 134,016 pigs, see
Table 2), second only to Croatia. In Greece, the percentage of smallholdings is relatively low (28.5%
has ≤ 10 animals), compared with the other countries in the ROC for which data were available
(Table 2). In Croatia, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Slovenia, the percentage of smallholders is higher
than the median value among the ROC countries.
The presence of free-ranging pigs in some areas in the region may contribute to the possible
spread of ASF in the ROC. This has been demonstrated in the past for other diseases, such as
Aujeszky’s disease or brucellosis in the ROC (Duvnjak et al., 2015; Milicevic et al., 2016; Zutic et al.,
2017). Free-ranging pig farming is a traditional husbandry practice in most countries in the ROC.
Autochthonous pig breeds (Black Slavonian, Turopolje, Mangalitsa, Moravka, East Balkan pig) are
usually reared in extensive or semi-extensive production systems that might facilitate contact with WB
(Ribani et al., 2019). Outdoor reared pigs in the region of Srem, north western Serbia, are part of an
extensive breeding system in the field and woods that can facilitate contacts with wild boar (Zutic
et al., 2017). A population genetics survey of wild boar in Europe was recently completed, mapping
the hybridisation of wild boar with domestic pigs. Individuals with more than 10% domestic ancestry in
their genome were mostly concentrated in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Serbia. The
study suggests that hybridisation has occurred over a long period and is still ongoing, as recent
hybrids were detected. The authors suggest that the pattern of wild boar hybridisation is due to
differences in farming practices (backyard or free-range) which facilitates domestic pig/wild boar
contacts and indicates risks for animal health (Iacolina et al., 2018). Similar findings were reported by
Nikolov et al. (2017) and Ribani et al. (2019). In addition, it has been shown that infectious diseases
are ‘shared’ between domestic pigs and wild boar. Studies on Brucella suis strains have provided
evidence that wild boar might be a source of infections for domestic pigs (Duvnjak et al., 2015; Zutic
et al., 2017). Other B. suis surveys suggested introduction of wild boar from central-Eastern Europe to
Italy for hunting purposes (Di Sabatino et al. 2017). In Serbia, WB and DP also share similar Suid
Herpesvirus 1 strains (Aujeszky’s disease; Milicevic et al., 2016). Further, farmed wild boar are present
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of training hunting dogs (Zahirovic et al., 2013) and
Marinou et al. (2015) mention ‘extensively farmed’ (fenced) WB in Greece.
The absence of the ban of swill feeding in the country is another indicator related to the pig
husbandry systems. In all countries of the ROC, except Montenegro, swill-feeding is forbidden by law.
Finally, home-slaughtering of animals could be a driver for the spread of the disease. Home-
slaughtering of pigs is allowed in all countries of the ROC, except Greece, which could be an important
indicator for spread of ASF, as feature of non-professional pig production, which is a known constraint
to ASF control (Mur et al., 2016). It should be noted though that illegal swill-feeding or home-
slaughtering can still occur, albeit in contradiction of the law, and thus this assessment is paired with
considerable uncertainty.
4.1.1.2. Indicators related to spread of ASF in wild boar populations
Currently, a WB density threshold under which the spread of ASF in WB populations would fade out
has not been determined, and ASF has occurred in regions where WB densities are very low (EFSA
AHAW Panel, 2018). Nonetheless, high WB density is recognised as a risk factor contributing to the
spread of ASF in WB. As illustrated in Table 5, the estimated median of relative WB abundance in the
ROC based on hunting bag per suitable habitat is between 0.6 and 1 WB per km2. In some areas in
the Baltic States, ASF has been present for 4 years and has spread to areas where WB densities are
estimated to be very low (e.g. below 0.4 animals/km2) (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018). Some countries
within the ROC have a relatively high WB abundance, such as Greece, Croatia and Slovenia. Therefore,
it is expected that the average WB density in the ROC will not impede the spread of the disease. The
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same could be said about the median suitable WB habitat in the countries of the ROC of 81.9% (see
Table 5), which is on average not less than those areas in Europe where ASFV has been detected for
several years.
Relative WB abundance in Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia and Greece has increased in recent decades
(Tsachalidis and Hadjisterkotis, 2008; Massei et al., 2015). Increasingly mild winters are strongly
associated with population increases across Europe, although there are region-specific threshold
temperatures for the onset of exponential growth (Vetter et al., 2015). Furthermore, abundant
availability of critical (energy-rich) food resources can outweigh the negative effects of cold winters on
population growth of WB (Vetter et al., 2015). The reproductive performance of WB in the ROC has
been studied by Sprem et al. (2016a). The mean number of fetuses per sow was 6.02 (4.62 per
juvenile, 6.39 per yearling and 6.77 per adult) suggesting a higher reproductive capacity compared with
other populations in southern and northern Europe, but comparable with some populations in central
Europe (Sprem et al., 2016a). Natural boundaries such as the Dinaric mountain chain in Croatia do not
represent a significant barrier for wild boar movements (Sprem et al., 2016b; EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018).
In Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, the WB density is lower than the median of the ROC
(median ROC = 0.6–1.0 wild boar/km) (see Table 5).
The suitable WB habitat is less than the median of the ROC (median ROC = 80%) in Albania,
Croatia, Greece and Serbia (see Table 5).
Supplementary feeding of WB is a widespread practice throughout Europe. A study in Bulgaria
investigated the species visiting feeding stations using camera traps. The WB were the most frequently
visiting mammal and spent the longest periods of time at the feeding stations (Popova et al., 2017). WB
feeding has been banned since December 2018 in Croatia (Zaklin Acinger-Rogic, personal
communication). Aggressive interactions among WB around feeding stations are likely to be a means of
ASFV transmission (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018). As there was no quantitative information on WB feeding
available for most of the ROC countries, this information was not used further in the assessment.
4.1.1.3. Indicators related to connectedness
The intensity of trade of live pigs and pork/products within the ROC is low compared with the
intense trade movements observed between EU MSs. Serbia is the largest pig producer in the ROC
(Table 2).
Based on the number of movements of live pigs reported to TRACES by the EU MS in the ROC, it
appears that most pig movements from the ROC originate from Croatia. However, not all trade data
are reported to TRACES, as this is not obligatory in the non-EU countries and the non-EU ROC
countries trade with each other, as demonstrated by data reported to UN COMTRADE. Therefore, there
is a considerable uncertainty around this trade indicator. In addition, trade between affected countries
in the EU is strictly regulated: products must be treated and no live animals can be exported from
affected countries to the 28 MS in the EU. Furthermore, trade between countries in the EU is
regulated. From ASF affected areas, there is a prohibition of trade of live pigs and pork, however strict
derogations apply (e.g. products must be treated).
In the ROC, domestic pig production is the most important livestock enterprise in Serbia and
Croatia, followed by Slovenia (Table 2). However, in terms of connectedness, these three countries
only export very small number of live pigs to other countries in the ROC.
There is substantial and ongoing movement of people between the countries within the ROC
(Section 3.1.3).
4.1.1.4. Indicators related to the societal context
In 2017, the percentage of the total population at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the ROC
had a median of 31.0% (Eurostat, 2019). One of the consequences of poverty, in the context of
assessing the potential risk of spread of ASF in the ROC, is the scarce availability of resources to
control the disease. The availability of sufficient and appropriate resources is critical to an effective
system for animal disease control. Furthermore, poverty has been associated with poorer compliance
with control measures. For example, poor households that keep a few pigs in backyard farms for
subsistence may not immediately notify the VA when suspecting ASF infection in their holding. In
addition, it can also be assumed that swill-feeding is more likely to occur in poor smallholder
households, in spite of any legislation in place that forbids the practice. Therefore, poverty is likely an
important factor that could potentially contribute to spread of ASF in the concerned area, given its
introduction.
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In terms of traditions that could influence the spread of ASF, the median pork consumption for
the ROC is relatively low (e.g. median of 26.8 kg of pork consumed per capita in the ROC) as shown in
Table 11; however, in some countries such as Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, the
consumption of pork is higher than the median and this may favour spread of ASF.
The median risk of poverty is 31.0% in the ROC (Table 10). The at risk of poverty rate in Greece,
Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia is above this median in the ROC. Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo have the highest levels of rural populations in Europe, with very high unemployment rates.
The labour markets in the western Balkan countries in general (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) are characterised by high unemployment
(Table 10).
4.1.1.5. Indicators related to preparedness and response activities
According to the data and information we received from the national authorities, most countries of
the ROC are relatively well prepared to deal with a potential incursion of ASF in their countries.
Contingency plans have been set up and are up to date in all but two countries of the ROC. Laboratory
capacities are sufficiently well developed to deal with ASF detection, with one exception and absence
of data in one country, and passive surveillance activities are being carried out (although the numbers
of animals tested are low). However, most countries in the ROC declared the need for further
improvement in the capacities of the VA to deal with a potential ASF outbreak. Also, the registration of
animal movement is absent, or not reported in two countries. Lack of traceability of animal movements
could be an important driver for the potential spread of the disease in the ROC, following an incursion.
Most of the countries in the ROC have a legislative framework in place that would allow them to
implement effective control measures in case of an incursion ASF.
According to the replies that the countries within the ROC provided to the survey carried out by the
GF-TADs, there are available resources such as consumables for outbreak investigations in the field,
whereas resources for carcass management and disposal are limited (suitable only for a small number
of outbreaks). Moreover, the countries within the ROC have only partially implemented activities to
reinforce the VAs with appropriate technical competences and human and financial resources for the
prevention and control of ASF.
All countries in the ROC, except Kosovo, have designated a NRL for ASF. Staff in these laboratories
have received training on diagnostic methods during at least the last 2 years. The NRLs of Croatia,
Greece, Slovenia and Serbia have in 2019 participated in proficiency tests organised by the EURL for
all diagnostic methods, except virus isolation, with satisfactory results.
Based on self-assessments, all countries within the ROC have adequate laboratory capacity to
produce rapid and reliable diagnosis of ASF in compliance with OIE standards. Most of the countries
also comply with the GF-TADS recommendations on laboratory diagnostics (Table 13).
The VAs of all countries within the ROC have participated in several relevant training activities
related to disease outbreak management and control (Table 15). No information was available from
Albania. Kosovo and Montenegro did not organise training on procedures for disease control. Seven
out of eight countries, from which information was available, declared to have only partially fulfilled
training programmes for all target groups, however. All the countries within the ROC have carried out
some level of awareness raising activities related to ASF, targeting relevant stakeholders, but most of
the countries only partially comply with the GF-TADS recommendations on risk communication.
According to the self-assessments, all countries in the ROC, for which information is available, fully
comply with the need to collaborate between the Competent authority and neighbouring countries,
other relevant authorities and stakeholders.
All the countries in the ROC with the exception of Albania and Montenegro have contingency
plans for ASF in place, most of which have been updated within the two last years. Most countries
have not carried out a simulation exercise for the contingency plan of ASF (Table 19).
Registration and identification systems for DP at national level are in place in mainly all countries
within the ROC, except Bosnia and Herzegovina where the registration system is not organised at
national level. However, systems for registration of pig movements are not present in all countries
within the ROC, namely Serbia has only a partial registration system for pig movements in place within
the country, and there are no data available from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The passive surveillance
system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro is only partially implemented.
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The overall estimation of the risk of spread within the ROC
A summary of the assessment of the above-mentioned indicators is provided in Table 20. Based on
a collective evaluation of all indicators, experts of the standing working group on ASF estimated by
consensus the likelihood of spread in the ROC as a whole and evaluated the uncertainty of their
assessment. It was concluded that due to the high number of indicators present in most of the
countries in the ROC and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread, especially
those related to the percentage of smallholder farms and risk of poverty, but also those related to the
connectedness between the countries in the ROC through movement of people, the probability that
ASF will spread once the disease is introduced in the ROC is between 66% and 100% (very high).
To determine whether a particular country within the ROC could be at higher probability of ASF
spread given an introduction of ASF, the value of indicators for that country (e.g. percentages of
smallholders) was compared to the median value of the indicators of the whole ROC. For quantitative
factors, those indicators that were above the regional median were considered ‘+’, and those below the
median were ‘’. For qualitative factors, binary indicators were given a ‘+’ if they were fulfilled, and a
‘’ if they were not ((Table 20). A country was considered at relative risk of ASF spread if at least one
qualitative indicator was present, or at least one quantitative indicator lay above the median (e.g. if ‘+’
were present for a given country). It was concluded that the presence of indicators varies between
countries in the ROC. Each of the assessed countries had several indicators present, suggesting that
each country is at risk of ASF spread following introduction. However, there are some countries with
higher numbers of pigs in combination with a high number of indicators present. This is likely to
represent a higher probability of spread following introduction.
Table 20: Summary of the assessment of the indicators that could influence the spread of ASF of
each country in the region of concern, compared with the median for each indicator
value in the region of concern
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ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania ? ? ? ? ? ? – – ? – + ? ? ? 2 10
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
– – ? + ? ? – – ? ? – – + + 3 5
Kosovo – – + + ? + – ? ? – – + + – 6 3
Montenegro + – – + – + – + ? – + – + + 7 1
North
Macedonia
– + – + – + – – + – – – + – 6 0
Serbia – + – + – + +** + + + – – + – 8 0
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia – + + + + – – + – – – – – – 5 0
Greece – + – – + – – + – – – – + – 4 0
Slovenia – + + + + + – + – – – – + – 7 0
Non-ROC ASF-affected countries in SE Europe
Romania – + +*** + – – na – + – – – na – 4 0
Bulgaria – + + + + – na – + – – – na – 4 0
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4.1.2. Potential spread of ASF, given introduction, from the region of concern to
non-affected EU countries
The main potential pathways of ASF spread from the ROC to non-affected MS are through
transboundary WB population, movements of pigs infected products or contaminated materials. The
presence of shared borders with non-affected countries was used as indicators of transboundary WB
populations. Slovenia is the only country in the ROC that has shared land borders with non-affected
MS in the EU. This could be an important indicator for potential transboundary spread of ASF through
the WB population. In addition, WB density in Slovenia is one of the highest densities in the ROC, with
1.73–2.77 WB per km square on average (Table 5).
People movement, either under the form of migration (Figures 4, and 6), tourism (Table 9) and
more in particular hunting tourism (Table 6), was used as an indicator for the potential movement of
products that could contain infectious virus. Tourism from non-affected EU MSs outside the ROC to
countries within the ROC is most important in Greece, Croatia, Slovenia and Albania (Table 9). As
commercial WB hunting/hunting tourism is quite popular in the ROC, there is a risk for introduction to
the non-affected MS outside the ROC through this pathway. However, there is no hunting tourism for
wild boar in Albania, Montenegro and Greece (Table 6). Labour movement to non-affected MSs outside
the ROC is highest from Albania (with immigrants especially going to Greece and Italy), second highest
from Kosovo (with most immigrants going to Germany) and thirdly from Serbia (with immigrants going
mainly to Austria and Germany). The median number of migrants from the western Balkan countries
to Europe in 2015 was 0.76 million people. Albania, Bosnia and Serbia have higher numbers of
migrants in Europe, whereas the other western Balkan countries have less migrants to the EU.
Therefore, there is a risk of ASF introduction from the ROC through this route, given that the disease
was introduced and established, especially when these labour migrants have potential direct or indirect
contact with domestic pigs or wild boar. It should be noted that pork production and consumption is
low in Albania, relatively low in Kosovo and high in Serbia (Figure 5).
As it could be a potential indicator for spread of ASF within the ROC, the high percentage of
smallholder farms in the ROC (see above) could also be an indicator for spread towards the non-
affected MS of the EU, mainly due to the lack of biosecurity and low traceability of pig movements to
and from these type of farms.
Trade of live pigs from the ROC to non-affected EU MSs is only authorised from the three MSs (in
accordance with Regulation 206/2010) i.e. Slovenia, Croatia and Greece, and is relatively more
important from Croatia. The other countries within the ROC are currently not on the list of approved
non-EU countries for export of live pigs or fresh/frozen pig meat. Trade from affected regions in the
EU is allowed under certain derogations in Implementing Decision 2014/709, which requires periods of
residency and pre-movement testing only for certain regions where ASF has not been detected in the
wild boar or domestic pigs population, or if animals are destined to slaughter. The dispatch of wild
boar caught from the wild from all MSs is prohibited to other MSs and to Third Countries (Point 3 of
Article 15 of Commission Implementing Decision 2014/709).
Poverty is a recognised driver for ASF spread in the ROC, which in turn increases the risk of ASF
spread to non-affected EU MS outside the ROC.
This assessment has included comparative information about Bulgaria and Romania, the two
countries in south-eastern Europe already affected by ASF at the time of assignment of the mandate.
The epidemiological presentation of ASF in these two countries has been very different, possibly due
to the greater relative importance of the smallholder sector in Romania compared to Bulgaria
(Table 21). The epidemiological circumstances at the time of the initial cases in each country may also
have differed, with implications for the subsequent epidemic in each country. The first cases of ASF in
Romania in July 2017 were a consequence of expansion of infection from known infected areas in
Ukraine, whereas the first cases of ASF in Bulgaria in September 2018 were likely to be linked to
recent Romanian cases near their shared border, possibly following one or several focal introductions.
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The challenges and responses for these differing epidemiological situations have been presented
previously (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2018). Romania and Bulgaria scored positive on nearly all indicators for
the risk of spread out of the area to non-affected EU countries. However, both Romania and Bulgaria
had less trade of pig and pork with non-affected EU countries outside the ROC, compared to the
median of the countries in the ROC (Table 21).
The overall estimation of the risk of spread from the region of concern to non-affected EU
countries
Table 21 finally summarises the presence of the indicators in the ROC, described previously, that could
favour spread of ASF from the ROC into the non-affected area of the EU. Trade of pork and pigs from the
ROC to non-affected MSs is very limited as EU rules do not permit the free trade of live pigs from third
countries to MSs and there is only limited trade in pig meat or pork products (only Serbia can trade treated
pig products from selected establishments); but also because the majority of pig farms in the ROC are
smallholders, and therefore, the pig meat is mainly for local consumption. Furthermore, the contribution
of natural movement of wild boar populations on the spread of ASF to not affected EU MS outside the ROC
is limited to only one land border of a country in the ROC (Slovenia) to two non-affected EU MS outside
the ROC. However, there is a high level of movement of people through tourism or migration.
Comparing the situation in the ROC with the presence of indicators in the already affected countries
in south-eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where no evidence of spread of ASF to other
EU MS was observed within one year after the first introduction in these two countries, the probability
of spread of ASF from the ROC to non-affected MSs in the EU within one year after introduction of ASF
in the ROC was estimated to be very low to low (from 0 to 15%).
The probability of spread from the ROC to non-affected MSs in the EU will be determined by the
specific socioeconomic indicators and indicators related to connectedness present in individual
countries of the ROC.
Table 21: Comparison of the assessment of indicators regarding the connectedness and societal
context that could influence the probability of spread from the Region of Concern to non-
affected EU MS outside the Region of Concern
Connectedness Societal context
Country
Shared
borders
Tourism
Labour
Migration*
Commercial
WB hunting/
hunting
tourism
Pig and pork
trade to non-
affected EU
countries**
At risk of
poverty*
% small
holders
ROC (Non-EU MSs)
Albania – – + – – ? ?
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
– – + + – ? ?
Kosovo – – – ? – ? +
Montenegro – – ? ? – ? –
North
Macedonia
– ? – + – + –
Serbia – – + + – + –
ROC (EU MSs)
Croatia – + na + + – +
Greece – + na ? + – –
Slovenia + – na + + – +
Countries in south-eastern Europe that are not part of the ROC
Romania + + + + – + +
Bulgaria + + + + – + +
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5. Conclusions
Potential spread of ASF within the ROC once introduced
• It was estimated that the probability that ASF will spread within the ROC within one year
following introduction is very high (between 66% and 100%). This estimate was determined
after considering the high number of indicators present in most of the countries in the ROC
and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread, especially those related to
the structure of the domestic pig sector, the presence of wild boar and social factors.
Comparison of potential spread of ASF between countries within the ROC, given
introduction
• The presence of indicators varies between countries in the ROC. Each country is at risk of ASF
spread following introduction, but every country had several indicators present.
• Some countries had higher numbers of pigs and a high number of indicators present. These
may have a higher probability of ASF spread following introduction.
Potential spread of ASF, given introduction, from the ROC to non-affected EU countries
outside the ROC
• The probability of spread of ASF from the ROC to non-affected MSs in the EU outside the ROC
within one year following introduction of ASF in the ROC was estimated to be very low to low
(from 0% to 15%). This estimate was based on the comparison of the indicators present in
the ROC and the already affected countries in south-eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and
Romania, where there was no evidence of ASF spread to other EU MS within one year.
• Several risk factors are relevant to this part of the assessment:
 Legal trade of live pigs and pig meat or products of pig origin from third countries of the
ROC to non-affected MS is very limited as EU rules provide strict risk mitigating measures.
These rules are also applicable to personal consignments.
 The majority of pig farms in the ROC are smallholders, which can be expected to mainly
produce for local consumption.
 The local movement of wild boar populations across borders would have a limited
impact on the probability of ASF spread from the ROC to MS outside the ROC, as there
is only one country (currently not affected) in the ROC with a land border to a non-
affected MSs.
 There is movement of people, such as tourism or migration. There is the potential that
people could carry pork products for personal consumption, which may end up in the
environment or illegally fed to pigs.
• Timely intervention to prevent ASF spread to non-affected areas within the ROC, as well as
from the ROC to non-affected EU MSs outside the ROC, is highly dependent on improved
preparedness, early detection and effective control of the disease.
6. Recommendations
Activities that increase the probability of early detection and preparedness or the effectiveness of
controlling disease can be recommended. However, the following recommendations can especially be
highlighted, based on the identified risk indicators in the ROC:
• Surveillance activities, especially passive surveillance of wild boar and domestic pigs, should be
reinforced in the ROC as it remains the most effective means for early detection of ASF,
benchmarking should be considered, to determine a threshold of the minimum number of wild
boar found dead to be tested.
• Awareness campaigns for travellers, hunters, farmers etc. should be further encouraged in the
ROC, in order to limit the risk of spread via movements of people, as well as to increase the
probability of early detection.
• Furthermore, regular repetitions and changes of awareness campaigns are recommended in
order to maintain awareness.
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• Active communication and collaboration among competent authorities and stakeholders should
be encouraged at national and international level in order to optimise the awareness
campaigns.
• Furthermore, increased collaboration, within and between countries, will increase the
probability of early detection and the effectiveness of the control of ASF. It is encouraged that
countries within the ROC share information regarding surveillance, suspicions etc. in order to
facilitate early detection.
• Training activities for VA staff, other competent authorities and hunters should be organised
frequently and cover all relevant ASF topics in order to increase the probability of early
detection and effective control. This is especially important, as seven out of nine countries
within the ROC felt that they have insufficient training of the VA staff.
• Few countries within the ROC had either no movement registrations (one country), no
contingency plan (two countries), incomplete NRL capacity (one country) or insufficient
surveillance (two countries). These deficiencies should be improved, as the first three reduce
the effectiveness of controlling disease, while the last one decreases the probability of early
detection as well as the effectiveness of control.
• To reduce the probability of spread through wild boar, preventive measures to reduce the wild
boar carrying capacity of wild boar habitat (feeding bans + limiting wild boar access to
attractive crops such as maize), along with actions to increase the annual wild boar hunting
harvest (aiming at > 65% of the estimated population) are recommended.
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Appendix A – Legislative framework
Table A.1: EU Legislation related to ASF and the main control measures to eliminate the identified
potential risks
Legislative
documents
Main control measures
Council Directive
2002/60/EC
Specific provisions
for the control of
ASF
Measures on a holding following suspicion or confirmation of ASF;
Measures and Epidemiological Investigation for contact holdings;
Establishment of protection and surveillance zone; Depopulation
and destruction of carcasses; Cleansing, Disinfection, insect
control; Repopulation of the holdings; Measures following
suspicion or confirmation in slaughterhouses; Measures following
suspicion or confirmation in vehicles or other means of transport;
Measures following suspicion or confirmation in feral pigs;
Establishment of infected area and measures following
confirmation in feral pigs; Contingency plan
Commission
Decision
2003/422/EC
Diagnostic manual
of ASF
Information on the causative agent; Differential diagnosis of ASF;
Criteria to recognise the suspicion on the field; Guidelines on
clinical examination; Sampling procedures (collection and transport
of samples); Guidelines on repopulation; Serological tests and
interpretation of the results; Virological tests and interpretation of
the results; Laboratory biosafety
Commission
Decision
2013/426/EU
Prevent the
introduction of ASF
from non-EU
countries through
vehicles for live
animals’
transportation
Measures for vehicles for live animals’ transport; Official checks
and controls to the vehicles at their entry to EU territory;
Declaration document by the owner/operator of the vehicle;
Cleansing and disinfection certification
Commission
Implementing
Decision
2014/709/EU Last
amended by
Commission
Implementing
Decision 2019/1247
Regionalisation
measures
Specific regionalisation measures taken into consideration the
evolution of ASF
Council Directive
2008/71/EC
Identification and
registration system
of pigs
Registration and identification of pig holding; Documents required
for animal movements; Identification marks for pigs
Commission
Decisions
2000/678/EC
National Databases
for porcine animals
Characteristics of the national databases for domestic pig
population
Commission
Regulation
206/2009
Introduction into
the European Union
of personal
Consignments of
products of animal
origin
Personal consignments of products of animal origin, for personal
human consumption; Personal consignments of animal products
destined for the feeding of pets; Information to be provided to the
travellers and to the general public; Official controls by the
competent authorities; Penalties and Sanctions
Table A.2: EU Guidelines related to ASF in order to support the implementation of measures
Legislative documents Main control measures
SANCO/7112/2015
(rev 3)
Principles and criteria for regionalisation • Factors to take into consideration
• Main criteria for demarcating the areas of
regionalisation
• Main criteria for lifting the measures
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Legislative documents Main control measures
SANCO/7113/2015
(rev 10)
ASF strategy for the EU • Pig farms classification (non-commercial,
commercial, outdoor)
• Biosecurity requirements for each farm
category
• Measures related to domestic pigs
• Measures related to wild boars
• Awareness campaigns
Table A.3: OIE standards for ASF
Legislative documents Main control measures
Terrestrial Code
(27th Edition 2018)
Chapter 15.1. Infection
with ASFV
• Criteria for determination of the ASF status of a country
zone or compartment
• Country or zone or compartment free from ASF
• Recovery of free status
• Recommendations for importation from countries, or zones
or compartments
• Procedures for inactivation of ASFV in different pig products,
trophies, animal by-products
• Surveillance strategies (domestic pigs, wild boars, arthropod
vectors)
Terrestrial Manual
(version May 2012)
Manual of diagnostic
tests and vaccines for
terrestrial animals.
• Identification of the agent
• Serological tests
• No vaccines available for ASF
GF-TADs Handbook
(version 25/09/2016)
(Standing Group of
Experts on African
swine fever in
Europe under the
GF-TADs umbrella)
Handbook on African
Swine Fever in wild
boar and biosecurity
during hunting
• Epidemiology of ASF in wild boar populations
• Aspects of wild boar biology and demography relevant to
control of ASF
• Approaches to wild boar population management in the
areas affected by ASF
• Biosecurity in infected forests
• Biosecurity during hunting
• Effective communications between veterinary authorities and
hunters
• Data collection
Table A.4: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) guidelines and manuals related to ASF
Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO)
Main control measures
Manual for veterinarians
(2017)
African swine fever
(ASF) detection and
diagnosis
• Transmission of the disease
• Clinical signs and lesions
• Diagnosis and differential diagnosis
• Outbreak investigation
• Biosecurity measures while visiting the farm
• Sampling packaging and transport of samples
• Laboratory diagnosis
• Prevention and control
Good practices for
biosecurity in the pig
sector (2010)
Biosecurity in the pig
sector
• Swine diseases, routes of transmission and implications
for biosecurity
• Structure of pig production and marketing chains:
 Pig production systems
 Service providers, suppliers and marketing chains
• Biosecurity issues and good practices in the pig sector
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Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO)
Main control measures
Manual on the
preparedness of ASF
contingency plans (2011)
Contingency plans • Nature of the disease
• Risk analysis
• Prevention strategies for ASF
• Early warning contingency planning for ASF
• Early reaction contingency planning for an ASF
emergency
• Organisational arrangements during an ASF emergency
campaign
• Support plans
• Action plan
• Training testing and revision of contingency plans
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Appendix B – Pig meat, meat preparations and products moved within the
EU with certificate model 2014/709
Declaration year
Origin Destination 2016 2017 2018
Quantity (kg) Quantity (kg) Quantity (kg)
Bulgaria Czechia 201.08
Bulgaria Germany 106,486
Bulgaria Italy 914
Bulgaria Romania 137,707.69
Bulgaria Spain 1,116.68
Croatia Germany 1,622.1 555.7
Estonia Finland 42,668.17 41,359.5
Estonia Hungary 4,182.96
Estonia Latvia 4,715,797.78 2,552,748.54 12,154.76
Estonia Lithuania 17,470.5
Estonia Romania 22,022.5
Germany Spain 141.45 136 172.5
Greece Romania 101.8 16,952.12 14,795.8
Hungary Austria 325
Hungary Czechia 270
Hungary France 5,390
Hungary Romania 570
Italy Austria 9,721.52 1,117.43 281.59
Italy Belgium 16,973.57 17,914.6 17,542.59
Italy Bulgaria 93.9 120.65 31.85
Italy Croatia (Local Name: Hrvatska) 7,973.11
Italy Czechia 265.1 93.15 95.75
Italy France 191,043.54 19,090.81 19,956.47
Italy Germany 14,463.39 11,513.82 12,250.75
Italy Hungary 133.67
Italy Ireland 132.7 485
Italy Latvia 133.6
Italy Luxembourg 71.6 225.2 193.1
Italy Malta 18.1 30.6
Italy Poland 335.08
Italy Portugal 38.75
Italy Slovakia (Slovak Republic) 17.6
Italy Spain 11.46 93.32
Italy Sweden 466.91 825.04 836.95
Italy The Netherlands 3,216.04 3,250.44 3,427.04
Italy United Kingdom 9,713.83 94,373.14 10,668.8
Romania Austria 582.11 9278 2,240.56
Romania Belgium 1,718.5 14,558.2 138,545.35
Romania Bulgaria 200,284.2
Romania Cyprus 4,709.2 11,282.2 30,486.86
Romania Denmark 1,729 838.26
Romania France 231,203 165,472.42 61,086.77
Romania Germany 1,326.85 34,664 74,699.37
Romania Greece 3,835 7,367
Romania Hungary 2,447.1 1,333.1 32,956.35
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Declaration year
Origin Destination 2016 2017 2018
Quantity (kg) Quantity (kg) Quantity (kg)
Romania Ireland 13,834.74
Romania Italy 113,848.36 146,444.3 1,127,340.78
Romania Poland 11,500 42,780
Romania Slovakia (Slovak Republic) 1,686.38
Romania Slovenia 3,950 3,700
Romania Spain 89,422.9 226,980.3 543,608.76
Romania Sweden 31 1,639.05
Romania The Netherlands 9,675.53
Romania United Kingdom 5,775.6 20,162.7 175,934.27
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Appendix C – Number of hunting permits issued by the Croatian Ministry of
Agriculture to foreign hunters in 2018 and 2019
Country
Number of hunting
permits 2018
Number of hunting
permits 2019
Italy 4,718 2,810
Austria 2,463 814
Slovenia 899 450
Germany 496 171
Bosnia and Herzegovina 199 126
Denmark 113 16
Sweden 99 27
Hungary 93 58
Switzerland 89 14
Norway 82 22
Serbia 62 21
Finland 44 4
Czechia 40 8
Slovakia 38 34
Netherlands 34 11
Ireland 22 1
United Kingdom 20 2
San Marino 18 11
Spain 14 1
Luxembourg 6 0
Poland 5 2
Bulgaria 3 0
North Macedonia 3 0
Lithuania 2 1
Belgium 1 7
Romania 1 1
Turkey 1 0
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